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Summary
Throughout much of the George W. Bush Administration, U.S.-China relations
have remained unusually smooth and stable.  But in the 109th Congress, U.S. policy
toward China appears to be subject to competing reassessments.  State Department
officials late in 2005 unveiled what they described as a new policy framework for the
relationship — one in which the United States was willing to work cooperatively
with a non-democratic China while encouraging Beijing to become a “responsible
stakeholder” in the global system.  Other U.S. policymakers appear to be adopting
somewhat tougher stances on issues involving China and U.S.-China relations,
expressing their concerns about strong PRC economic growth and a more assertive
and influential PRC diplomacy in the international arena.  
Taiwan, which the PRC considers a “renegade province,” remains the most
sensitive issue the two countries face and the one many observers fear could lead to
potential Sino-U.S. conflict. While Beijing has long maintained it has the right to use
force to “reunify” with Taiwan, late in 2004 Chinese officials launched an effort to
codify this assertion with an “anti-secession” law (adopted in March 2005) aimed at
curbing Taiwan independence.  U.S. officials regarded the action as provocative,
saying it was unconstructive for regional stability.  The PRC move prompted
renewed concerns and activity among Taiwan’s supporters in Congress.  
Another matter of growing U.S. concern is China’s increasing global “reach”
in recent years and the consequences that Beijing’s expanding economic and political
influence have for U.S. interests.  To feed its appetite for resources, China is steadily
signing trade agreements, oil and gas contracts, scientific and technological
cooperation, and multilateral security arrangements with countries around the world,
some of which are key U.S. allies.  Some U.S. observers view these activities as a
threat to the United States; a number of PRC moves since then to improve relations
with Taiwan and ease cross-strait tensions have not eased these congressional
concerns.  Even if these trends are simply the results of China’s benign economic
development and growth, they may pose critical future challenges for U.S. economic
and political interests. 
Much of current concern about China appears driven by security calculations at
the Pentagon and in Congress.  In remarks at a Singapore Conference in June 2005,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld questioned the motivations behind China’s
expanding military budget and stated that a congressionally mandated DOD report
in 2005 concludes Beijing is greatly understating its military expenditures.  Bilateral
economic and trade issues also remain matters of concern, with U.S. officials and
Members of Congress this year particularly criticizing China’s failure to halt piracy
of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) and China’s continued constraints on its
currency valuation.  In the February 2005 State Department Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices, U.S. officials again classified China’s human rights record
as poor.  Beijing continues its crackdown on independent religious organizations,
citizens accused of leaking state secrets, and other political activists. 
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Most Recent Developments
January 18, 2006 — PRC sources confirmed that North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il
had just completed a secretive, eight-day visit to China, ostensibly to discuss the Six-
Party Talks.
January 14, 2006 — Villagers in Panlong village in Guangdong Province were
attacked by police officers (and possibly paramilitary troops) on their sixth day of
protests against government land seizures. 
January 8, 2006 — China’s State Council issued a national emergency response
plan, dividing emergencies into four categories: natural disasters; accidents; public
health incidents; and social safety incidents.  The plan also will establish an office
in charge of emergency response management, answerable to the State Council to
collect information and coordinate emergency response.    
January 4, 2006 — Bolivia’s president-elect Evo Morales arrived in Beijing for
a two-day visit, saying China was “a political, ideological and programmatic ally of
the Bolivian people” and inviting China to develop Bolivia’s natural gas reserves.
Background and Overview
Introduction 
U.S.-China relations, remarkably smooth from 2001-2004, became more
problematic again in 2005 as some U.S. policymakers appear to be adopting tougher
stances on issues involving China and U.S.-China relations.  Throughout much of the
George W. Bush Administration, U.S.-China relations were smoother than they had
been at any time since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.   The two
governments resumed regular high-level visits and exchanges of working level
officials, resumed military-to-military relations, cooperated on anti-terror initiatives,
and worked closely to restrain and eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons
activities.  U.S. companies continued to invest heavily in China, and some PRC
companies began investing in the United States.  
Despite this, thorny problems continue to be factors in the relationship,
including difficulties over China’s intentions toward and U.S. commitments to
democratic Taiwan, various disputes over China’s failure to protect U.S. intellectual
property rights, and the economic advantage it gains from pegging its currency to a
CRS-2
1 In the United States only, the term “most-favored-nation” (MFN) status has been replaced
by the term “normal trading relations” (NTR) status.  
basket of international currencies.  In addition, China’s accelerating rise in the world
has significant implications for U.S. power and influence around the globe.  In
pursuit of its economic development agenda, China’s enormous and growing appetite
for energy, raw materials, and other resources has led it to seek an increasing number
of economic and energy-related agreements around the world, many of them with key
U.S. allies.  A number of new developments and statements since late 2004 suggest
that U.S. policymakers are reassessing the relationship in light of strong PRC
economic growth and a more assertive PRC international posture.  
Background 
For much of the 1990s, a number of factors combined to ensure that U.S.
congressional interest in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) increased annually.
In the years after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, Members often felt that
they were neither consulted nor listened to by the Executive Branch concerning the
appropriate direction for U.S. China policy.  Without the strategic imperative that the
Soviet Union had once provided for comprehensive U.S.-China relations, individual
Members began to raise their own more narrowly focused concerns in China policy,
such as efforts on behalf of Taiwan, in favor of human rights, or against forced
sterilization and abortion.  
During the later Clinton Administration, when U.S. officials were pursuing a
“strategic partnership” with China, some Members became increasingly concerned
that the U.S. government was not thinking seriously enough about the PRC as a
longer-term threat to U.S. interests.  Members were particularly concerned about
supporting the democratization and growing political pluralism Taiwan had
embraced since abandoning authoritarian rule.  Congress in these years enacted more
provisions to accommodate Taiwan’s interests, engaged in repeated and protracted
efforts to further condition or even withdraw the PRC’s most-favored-nation (MFN)
trade status, held hearings and considered legislation targeting the PRC’s human
rights violations, created two commissions to monitor PRC developments, and
imposed a host of requirements on the U.S. government to monitor, report on, and
restrict certain PRC activities.1
In late 2001, however, U.S.-China relations began to experience a sustained
period of unusual stability, and Congress as a whole became less vocal and less
legislatively active on China-related issues.  The reasons for this could not be
attributed to any resolution of entrenched bilateral policy differences — such as those
long held over human rights or on Taiwan’s status — for these differences still
existed and are likely to plague the relationship for the foreseeable future.  Rather,
other factors and policy trends appeared to be at work:  
! Assertiveness on China.  The Bush Administration early on sought
to distance itself from the policies of “engagement” favored by
American Presidents since 1979 and instead de-emphasized the
importance of Sino-U.S. relations in American foreign policy, even
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2 At its 16th Party Congress (November 8-14, 2002), the PRC’s Communist Party selected
a new Party General Secretary (Hu Jintao), named a new 24-member Politburo and a new
nine-member Standing Committee, and made substantive changes to the Party constitution.
Further changes in government positions were made during the 10th meeting of the National
People’s Congress in March 2003, and in September 2004. For more on the leadership
transition, see CRS Report RL31661, China’s New Leadership Line-up:  Implications for
U.S. Policy, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
while being open to substantively and symbolically meaningful
dialogue with China at most senior levels. 
! Support for Taiwan.  The Bush Administration was more
supportive of Taiwan security than were any previous U.S.
Administrations.  Some suggested that greater support for Taiwan
served to balance U.S. contacts with the PRC and eliminate
recurring White House tensions with Congress, where Taiwan is an
interest of many Members.
! Changing U.S. Priorities.  September 11, the resulting U.S.-led
anti-terrorism war, and U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and
Iraq brought about dramatic changes in global and national priorities
 — including new agendas within Congress — that took precedence
over many other foreign policy issues, including the PRC.
! Changing PRC Priorities.  After 2001, the PRC became
preoccupied with a wholesale transition to a new generation of
leaders who began to put their own stamp on policy decisions.  New
PRC leaders remained focused on maintaining social stability,
nurturing China’s growing international economic clout, and
expanding its increasingly modulated and proactive foreign policy.2
This report addresses relevant policy questions in current U.S.-China relations,
discusses trends and key legislation in the 109th Congress, and provides a chronology
of developments and high-level exchanges from January 2005 onward.   It will be
updated as events warrant.  Additional details on the issues discussed here are
available in other CRS products, noted throughout this report.  For background
information and legislative action preceding 2005, see CRS Report RL31815, China-
U.S. Relations During the 108th Congress, by Kerry Dumbaugh.  CRS products can
be found on the CRS website at [http://www.crs.gov/].
Key Current Issues
U.S.-PRC “Senior Dialogue”
On December 7, 2005, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and PRC
Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo met in Washington D.C. to begin the Second
U.S.-China Senior Dialogue meeting to discuss “the strategic and conceptual
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3 Deputy Secretary  Zoellick used the phrase to describe the first senior dialogue meeting
in Beijing in August 2005, at which the two sides discussed energy security, terrorism,
economic development and trade, and issues of democracy, freedom, and human rights.  
4 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher in the daily press briefing of April 8, 2005.
5 According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  See website at
[http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/asia.htm]
framework” of U.S.-China relations and other issues.3  The idea for an ongoing
dialogue was suggested by PRC President Hu Jintao during a meeting with President
Bush at the November 2004 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in
Chile.  Preparations were finalized during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s
subsequent visit to China.   The talks, which are planned to be held twice annually,
represent the first time in the U.S.-PRC relationship that dialogue at this level of
seniority has been held on a regular basis.  They suggest, in the words of a U.S.
official spokesman, an American recognition of “the role that China is playing in
Asia, in global affairs, [and] as a member of the U.N. Security Council.”4   
Along with the establishment of regular U.S.-China talks, a speech given by
Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick on September 21, 2005, suggests there is an
Administration effort underway to explore a new framework for U.S. diplomacy with
China.  Zoellick’s speech appeared designed to strike a balance somewhere between
the “open door/engagement” school of thought and the more dire security threat
concerns regularly raised by Pentagon planners (as expressed in the latest Pentagon
report, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, released on July 19, 2005).
Zoellick’s September 2005 speech emphasized the benefits of U.S.-China
cooperation but focused on urging the PRC to become a “responsible stakeholder”
— to not only reap the economic benefits of the global system but also to assume
greater responsibilities in its global economic and political diplomacy.  According
to Zoellick, the United States is prepared to work cooperatively with a non-
democratic China even as U.S. officials seek to improve China’s democratic
prospects.
Avian Flu
The close proximity of millions of people, birds, and animals in southern China
has made it a common breeding ground for deadly types of influenza viruses,
including the new H5N1 virus now afflicting poultry throughout Asia.  Added to this,
the PRC’s poor public health infrastructure and the traditionally secretive, non-
transparent policy approach of its communist government have made international
health specialists particularly concerned about the PRC as a potential contributor to
a global flu pandemic.  On January 27, 2004, the PRC became the tenth Asian
country to acknowledge ongoing outbreaks of avian flu in poultry populations within
its borders.  According to the World Health Organization (WHO), H5N1 is now
considered endemic in parts of China, afflicting not only domestic poultry and
migratory birds, but also parts of China’s pig population.5  During a U.N. summit on
September 13, 2005, President George Bush and PRC President Hu Jintao reportedly
discussed greater avian flu coordination, including an aggressive containment
CRS-5
6 King Jr., Neil, “Hu pledges efforts to ease U.S. strains — ,” Asian Wall St. Journal,
September 15, 2005, p. A1.  
7 On December 15, 2005, PRC officials announced the sixth human case of avian flu.
8 Beijing Liaowang in Chinese.  Translated on September 26, 2005, in FBIS,
CPP20051018050001.
9 PRC Ministry of Health, “Preparations and Plan for an Influenza Pandemic Emergency,”
September 28, 2005, translated in FBIS, CPP20051012335002 (October 12, 2005).  
10 In addition to the PRC, the conference was co-hosted by the World Bank and the
European Commission.  
11 The independent virology team was from the University of Hong Kong, and included Dr.
Guan Yi, a co-author of the scientific report published in Nature magazine on July 7, 2005.
For reference to PRC official Jia Youling’s comments, see Sipress, Alan, “China has not
shared crucial data on bird flu outbreaks, officials say,” in the Washington Post, July 19,
2005, p. A15.
12 Washington Post, June 18, 2005, p. A01.  Some sources also have suggested that the
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approach and establishment of an early-warning system.6  Two months later, on
November 16, 2005, Chinese officials reported the country’s first human cases of
avian flu.7  As of January 19, 2006, the number of PRC human cases of avian flu has
grown to nine, with six fatalities.
As a result of the 2003 global crisis with SARS, a new virus which originated
in China in 2003-2004, PRC leaders appear to have grown more sensitive to the
potential catastrophic effects of an avian flu pandemic.  The PRC Ministry of Health
reports it has established 63 influenza monitoring labs throughout China8 and has
crafted and published an emergency plan for an influenza pandemic, including a four-
color-coded notification system.9   On November 2, 2005, the government announced
further aggressive anti-flu measures.  These included an earmark of 2 billion yuan
($420 million) from China’s current budget to fight avian flu and the banning of
poultry imports from 14 countries affected by the virus.  On January 17-18, 2006, the
PRC co-hosted in Beijing an international conference on avian and human influenza
at which participating countries pledged $1.9 billion to fight the disease.10  
Despite these PRC initiatives, some international health experts quietly continue
to question the PRC’s transparency on avian flu issues.  In late April and June 2005,
for instance, PRC officials reported an unknown cause for the suspicious sudden
deaths of thousands of migratory birds in western China’s Qinghai Lake.  In July
2005, a virology team from Hong Kong reported in a scientific journal that their
research showed the Qinghai bird deaths were from an H5N1 strain genetically
similar to that originating in south China.  The Hong Kong report was vigorously
criticized as inaccurate by Jia Youling, an official with the PRC Ministry of
Agriculture charged with coordinating avian-flu eradication.11  On June 18, 2005, the
Washington Post reported that Chinese farmers had been using one of two types of
anti-influenza drugs (amantadine, a drug meant for humans) to treat poultry for the
H5N1 bird flu virus, rendering the drug ineffective against the virus strain in humans
 — a story that PRC officials also have denied.12 
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virus’s apparent new resistance to known drugs may be the result of renegade
pharmaceutical labs in China dispensing the wrong anti-viral medications, raising additional
questions about the PRC government’s ability to exert control over a potential pandemic.
International Herald Tribune, July 5, 2005, p. 3.
13 In a June 17, 2005 letter to President Bush, California Congressmen Richard Pombo and
Duncan Hunter urged the President to begin a review of the U.S. security implications of
such a sale.  The letter was made available to Reuters.
14 These views are espoused, for instance, by Robert J. Samuelson, economic columnist for
Newsweek (“Let’s Stay Out of This Fight...”, Newsweek, July 11, 2005); Philip Verleger, a
specialist in the economics of international energy at the Institute for International
Economics in Washington, D.C. (“Many Oil Experts Unconcerned Over China Unocal Bid,”
Washington Post, July 1, 2005, p. D01); and Paul Magnusson, international trade economist
for BusinessWeek (“Play Fair, and Insist That China Do the Same...”, BusinessWeek, July
11, 2005, p. 31).
15 Similar views, for instance, are held by John Tkacik, senior research expert on China at
the Heritage Foundation (“Say No to CNOOC’s bid for Unocal,” Asian Wall St. Journal,
June 29, 2005, p. A5); and Larry Wortzel, member of the congressionally established U.S.
China Security Review Commission (“The Big Tug of War Over Unocal,” The New York
Times, July 6, 2005, p. 1.  
PRC Bids to Purchase U.S. Companies   
Although PRC investment in the United States has been minimal to date, PRC
companies have made several high-profile purchases and bids for American
companies.  In December 2004, the PRC’s Lenovo Group Ltd. purchased IBM’s
personal computer division for $1.25 billion.  On June 21, 2005, the Haier Group, the
PRC’s preeminent  refrigerator manufacturer, teamed with a consortium of investors
in a $1.28 billion offer for the Maytag Corporation, owner of the Amana, Jenn-Air,
and Hoover brands, although the Haier offer was withdrawn on July 18, 2005.  In the
most sensitive case, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), one of the
PRC’s largest state-controlled companies, on June 21, 2005, made an unsolicited
cash bid of $18.5 billion for the U.S. oil company Unocal, topping the initial winning
bid of $16.4 billion made two months earlier by California-based Chevron.  CNOOC
withdrew its bid on August 2, 2005, in the wake of heated U.S. opposition. 
The CNOOC bid for Unocal set off a spirited debate about the national security
risks of selling American energy assets to the PRC.13  Many energy economists and
business representatives maintained that oil resources are fungible commodities,
making ownership irrelevant compared to market forces.14  Opponents of the deal
asserted that U.S. oil reserves and energy companies are vital strategic assets, that the
United States would be economically and strategically vulnerable if these assets were
owned by a Communist country, and that sale of Unocal holdings throughout Asia
would push the region further into China’s economic orbit.15  Members of Congress
appeared most concerned about the potential security risks in the CNOOC deal.  On
June 30, 2005, the House approved an amendment (333-92) by Representative
Kilpatrick to H.R. 3058 prohibiting the Treasury Department from using federal
monies to approve the CNOOC bid for Unocal.  The same day, House Members
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adopted H.Res. 344 (398-15), urging President Bush to immediately review any
CNOOC final agreement to buy Unocal.
Taiwan
Taiwan remains the most sensitive and complex issue that U.S. policymakers
face in bilateral Sino-U.S. relations.  It is the issue that many observers most fear
could lead to potential U.S.-China conflict. Beijing continues to lay sovereign claim
to Taiwan and vows that one day Taiwan will be reunified with China either
peacefully or by force.  Beijing has long maintained that it has the option to use force
should Taiwan declare independence from China.  On December 27, 2004, the PRC
emphasized this point again in its fifth white paper on national security, entitled
“China’s National Defense in 2004.”16  The paper called the Taiwan independence
movement the single biggest threat to China’s sovereignty and to regional peace, and
it vowed to prevent Taiwan independence at all costs.  Chinese leaders are supporting
these long-standing claims with more than 700 missiles deployed opposite Taiwan’s
coast and with a program of military modernization and training that defense
specialists believe is based on a “Taiwan scenario.”  
Concerns have intensified in recent years because of Taiwan’s unpredictable
political environment, where the balance of political power has teetered precipitously
between two contending political party coalitions.  One of these, led by the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), controls the presidency and is closely
associated with advocates of Taiwan independence.  Taiwan’s President, Chen Shui-
bian, is a DPP member who has spent much of his political career pushing for a
separate international identity for Taiwan and referring to Taiwan as “already” an
independent country.  The other party coalition, led by the remnants of the once-
dominant Nationalist Party (KMT), advocates greater policy caution and more
engagement with the PRC.  Since 2004, the DPP has taken a beating in several
electoral contests: the KMT was returned to its slim majority in the legislature in
December 2004 elections, and KMT candidates won 14 of 23 constituencies in local
elections for city mayors and county magistrates, held on December 3, 2005.
PRC Anti-Secession Law.  On March 14, 2005, the PRC’s National
People’s Congress (NPC) officially adopted an “anti-secession law,” aimed at reining
in Taiwan independence advocates and creating a legal basis for possible PRC
military intervention in Taiwan.  American observers and U.S. officials termed the
initiative counterproductive, particularly given improvements in a range of Taiwan-
China contacts since December 2004.  Critics fear that the anti-secession law
increases the possibility of conflict with Taiwan and that the provision could be used
to harass independence advocates in Taiwan by, for example, labeling them
“criminals” and demanding their extradition from third countries.  While many of the
new law’s 10 articles appear relatively conciliatory, Article 8 is of special concern
because of its specific authorization of force.  Article 8 states:
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17 Full text of the law can be found in the Chinese newspaper China Daily at the following
website [http://english.people.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html].
18 “It’s classic divide-and-conquer strategy: Assemble the most allies possible and isolate
your enemy.”  Jean-Philippe Beja, senior fellow at the Center for International Studies and
Research in Paris.  Cited in Magnier, Mark and Tsai Ting-I, “China tries new tactic with
Taiwan,” Los Angeles Times, April 29, 2005, p. A-3.
19 Since the 1970s, when the United States broke relations with Taiwan in order to normalize
relations with Beijing, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been shaped by the three U.S.-China
communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8), and the so-called Six Assurances. See
CRS Report 96-246, Taiwan: Texts of the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S.-China
Communiques, and the “Six Assurances”, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
20 As an example, in an ABC television interview on April 25, 2001, President Bush
responded to a question about what his Administration would do if Taiwan were attacked
by saying that the United States would do “whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend itself.
Critics of the statement said that the United States had no defense alliance with Taiwan and
had remained deliberately ambiguous about its reaction if Taiwan were attacked.
Article 8.  In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should
act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from
China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should
occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely
exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary
measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  The State
Council and the Central Military Commission shall decide on and execute the
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures...17
Changing PRC Political Pressure on Taiwan.  In the aftermath of the
heavy-handed anti-secession law, PRC officials appear to have decided that a Taiwan
policy of greater nuance and finesse may be of more service to mainland policy
interests.  In recent months, then, Beijing officials have taken a series of actions
designed to increase pressure on the Chen government to be more accommodating
to mainland concerns.  While some China-watchers describe these measures as
positive developments for cross-strait relations, others see the moves as an effort by
Beijing to capitalize on and exploit Taiwan’s internal political divisions and to
further isolate and weaken President Chen and his pro-independence DPP
government.18  Among other measures, Chinese leaders have issued a series of
invitations to key political leaders in the KMT, PFP, and other Taiwan opposition
parties — but not to the elected government — to visit China and hold talks.  U.S.
officials are concerned about the motivations of the visits (which one U.S.
Government official termed “not benign on either side”) and have stressed that PRC
officials should be speaking with the democratically elected Taiwan government.
U.S. Taiwan Policy and U.S. Arms Sales.  U.S. policymakers generally
have tried to maintain a delicate balancing act between Taiwan and the PRC,
periodically admonishing each side not to take provocative action that could
destabilize the status quo.19  The George W. Bush Administration is regarded as
having been more solicitous and supportive of Taiwan than any previous U.S.
Administration since 1979.20  Among other steps, the Administration in its first term
did the following:
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(continued...)
! Responded to Taiwan’s annual request to purchase specific U.S.
weapons by approving a more robust arms sales package to Taiwan,
including Kidd-class destroyers, diesel submarines, and P-3C Orion
aircraft.21
! Enhanced military-to-military contacts, including meetings between
higher-level officers; cooperation on command, control, and
communications; and training assistance.22
! Approved transit visas for top Taiwan officials to come to the United
States, including Taiwan’s President and Vice-President.  
But faced with increasingly heated political battles between the pro-
independence DPP and the status-quo KMT, Bush Administration officials have
appeared to ease somewhat their support of the Taiwan  government since late 2003.
The apparent reassessment was telegraphed on December 9, 2003, when President
Bush, while standing next to visiting PRC Premier Wen Jiabao, issued a blunt
warning to Taiwan, saying “The comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan
indicate he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally that change the status quo,
which we oppose.”23  In addition, U.S. officials have expressed increasing frustration
in the ensuing months over Taiwan’s lagging arms purchases from the United States.
Growing political disagreements in Taiwan so far have kept the government from
purchasing much of the weapons President Bush approved for sale in 2001.  To date,
these disagreements have stalled a special arms acquisition budget that the DPP
government submitted to Taiwan’s legislature — originally for $18 billion, then
slashed to $15 billion and finally $11 billion in an effort to attract legislative support.
Opposition KMT lawmakers continue to block consideration of the bill, arguing that
its cost is too high and the weapons do not meet Taiwan’s needs, while pro-
independence advocates have argued and demonstrated for the budget.24  U.S.
officials appear frustrated with the years of delay over the special arms budget and
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Similar controversies have occurred over other potential sales — such as the
possible sale of an early-warning radar system to Taiwan to counter the PRC’s
missile threat.  Lockheed Martin withdrew its bid to supply such a system after strong
criticism of the deal reportedly prompted Taiwan military authorities to begin re-
examining the proposed purchase.26  Apart from this, other limited arms purchases
are continuing.  On October 26, 2005, for instance, the White House notified
Congress that it had approved for sale to Taiwan 10 AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles
and 5 AIM-7M Sparrow missiles, worth as much as $280 million, both systems
manufactured by Raytheon.  The sale also reportedly included logistics support for
F-16 aircraft and continuation of a pilot training program.27   
Taiwan and the World Health Organization (WHO).  For eight years,
Taiwan’s application for observer status in the WHO has been defeated — most
recently on May 16, 2005, at the annual meeting of WHO’s administrative arm, the
World Health Assembly (WHA).  Opposition from the PRC routinely has blocked
Taiwan’s bids on political grounds. PRC officials have argued that since Taiwan is
not a state but a part of China it cannot be separately admitted to U.N. entities for
which sovereign status is a pre-requisite for membership. Taiwan authorities
maintain that “observer status” in WHO  would be an apolitical solution in Taiwan’s
case, since other non-sovereign entities, like the Holy See and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, have been given such status.  The U.S. Government is on
record as supporting Taiwan’s membership in organizations “where state-hood is not
an issue.”28  In 2004, the 108th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 108-28) requiring
the Secretary of State to seek Taiwan’s observer status in WHO at every annual
WHA meeting.29
Official Taiwan-PRC Contacts.  While the Lien-Soong PRC visits earlier
this year were conducted in the two party leaders’ private capacities, official talks
between China and Taiwan last occurred in October 1998, when Koo Chen-fu,
Chairman of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Wang Daohan,
president of the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
(ARATS), held meetings in Shanghai.30  But while official talks have remained
stymied, indirect ties and unofficial cross-strait contacts have continued to grow and
have seen significant recent breakthroughs.  Taiwan businesses are increasingly
invested across the strait, although the exact figures remain unclear.  Taiwan-China
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trade has also increased dramatically over the past decade, so that China now has
surpassed the United States as Taiwan’s most important trading partner.  According
to one report, statistics show Taiwan’s total bilateral trade with the PRC rose to
$61.64 billion in 2004 — a 33.1% increase over 2003.31
This increasing economic interconnectedness with the PRC has put pressure on
Taiwan’s DPP government to further accommodate the Taiwan business community
by easing restrictions on direct travel and investment to the PRC.  On November 18,
2005, Taiwan and China announced that for only the second time (the first being
January 2005), direct cross-strait charter flights would be allowed for the duration of
the upcoming Lunar New Year from January 20 - February 13, 2006.  The
arrangements for 2006 are less restrictive than those for 2005.  In addition to
expanding eligibility for the flights to all Taiwan residents, the number of flights
have been expanded (to 36 from each side) as well as the number of destinations
(adding Xiamen to last year’s approved destinations of Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou).  But such cross-strait accommodations are worrisome to the DPP’s pro-
independence political base in Taiwan, who believe that further economic ties to the
mainland will erode Taiwan’s autonomy and lead to a “hollowing out” of Taiwan’s
industrial base.32  Thus, each Taiwan government decision to facilitate economic
links with the PRC represents an uneasy political compromise.  
China’s Growing Global Reach 
Many observers have begun to focus on the critical implications that China’s
economic growth and increasing international engagement could have for U.S.
economic and strategic interests.  To feed its voracious appetite for resources, capital,
and technology, China has steadily and successfully sought trade agreements, oil and
gas contracts, scientific and technological cooperation, and even multilateral security
arrangements with countries both around its periphery and around the world.  Dubbed
the “charm offensive” by some observers, China’s growing international economic
engagement has gone hand-in-hand with expanding political influence.  Although
some believe that PRC officials appear more comfortable working with undemocratic
or authoritarian governments, PRC outreach also has extended to key U.S. allies or
to regions where U.S. dominance to date has been unparalleled and unquestioned.
A brief survey of China’s recent international engagement hints at the potential for
increasing Sino-U.S. competition for resources, power, and influence around the
world.  
Asia.  China’s improved relationships with its regional neighbors are
particularly visible.  On December 14, 2005, China took part in the first East Asia
Summit (EAS) — a fledgling grouping of 16 Asian countries, including the ten
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, South
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Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand — but not including the United States.33
Russia, in the form of President Putin, attended as an invited observer.  According
to a statement issued after the summit, the purpose of the new grouping is to permit
“dialogue on broad strategic, political, and economic issues.”34
For decades prior to the mid-1990s, Sino-ASEAN relations were characterized
by recurring clashes over territorial disputes, diplomatic deadlocks,  and deep
ASEAN concerns about China’s military ambitions and its regional economic
competitiveness.35  The 2005 EAS meeting represents the latest step in a trend of
growing Sino-ASEAN regional cooperation.  In addition to being part of an
economic partnership in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping (including also
Japan and South Korea, two U.S. military allies),  China signed a free trade
agreement with ASEAN in November 2004.  Under the agreement, beginning July
1, 2005, all parties pledge to start lowering or cancelling tariffs on 7,000 kinds of
items, with the goal of reaching full mutual free trade by 2010.  Within ASEAN,
China’s relations with  Burma are unique, as Beijing has provided Rangoon with
substantial military, economic, and infrastructure development assistance.  According
to a reported internal Department of Defense (DOD) document, Beijing is building
naval bases in Burma that will give China its only access to the Indian Ocean.36
Outside the EAS framework, China has also improved its bilateral relationship
with India, with which it fought several border wars in the 1960s, and with Central
Asia.  On January 24, 2005, China and India began a “strategic dialogue,” discussing
terrorism, resource competition, and the U.S. role in Asia.  During a visit to South
Asia in early April 2005, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao alluded to his stop in India (on
April 9) as his “most important agenda item” in 2005.37  With the Central Asian
countries of the former Soviet Union, China has pursued both economic and security
arrangements through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), founded in
2001.38  Within the SCO context, China has cooperated on border enforcement,
signed pipeline and rail link agreements, and conducted joint military maneuvers.
China also has negotiated energy deals with Australia, another U.S. regional ally, to
supply liquid natural gas to southern China, and is expecting this year the completion
of a feasibility study relating to a Sino-Australian free trade agreement.
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Japan.  Japan, considered the most important American ally in Asia, is a
notable exception to China’s recent regional diplomatic achievements.  As with other
Asian countries, China’s trading relations with Japan have expanded; in 2004, China
(including Hong Kong) surpassed the United States as Japan’s largest trading
partner,39 but the political relationship remains hampered by the residual resentments
of Japan’s conquest and occupation of China during World War II.  China routinely
protests Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to pay tribute to Japanese
war dead at the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine, where war criminals are also enshrined.
Since Koizumi first visited the shrine in 2001, China has used the issue to justify its
refusal to engage in bilateral summitry, except as part of multilateral meetings.
Historical animosities also plagued China’s loss to Japan in an August 2004  soccer
match, when Chinese fans rioted and spat on the visiting Japanese team and its fans.
Furthermore, since 2004 China’s growing economic competitiveness and
expanding regional presence have helped exacerbate its relations with Tokyo.  China
and Japan competed ferociously for access to Siberian oil, with Japan emerging the
major winner in a contract to have a main pipeline built to Japan, with a smaller
branch running to China.  As a result of China’s exploration activities in the
Chunxiao Gas Field, in waters where Japan and Taiwan also have territorial claims,
Tokyo has begun its own exploration activities in and around the Senkakus.
Tensions also have escalated over China’s oil explorations in areas of the South
China Sea over which Japan also claims sovereignty.  
Japanese officials have cut Overseas Development Aid (ODA) to China by
around half since 2000.  In December 2004, Japan for the first time defined China as
a potential security threat, and the following month Tokyo hosted a visit by Lee
Teng-hui, a former president of Taiwan who is anathema to Beijing.  These tensions
appear to have brought Japan closer to U.S. policy positions in recent months.
Japanese officials publicly have supported U.S. opposition to European Union (EU)
plans to end an arms embargo to China, and on February 19, 2005, U.S. and Japanese
officials issued a joint statement declaring a number of common strategic objectives
for the first time in decades.  These common objectives specifically included peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue. 
Russia.  Energy resources and security issues also factor heavily into China’s
relations with Russia, where as noted above Beijing lost out to Japan in securing a
monopoly pipeline supply from Siberian oil fields.  Russia also meets regularly with
PRC leaders through the forum of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where
Russia is one of the six members.  On February 2, 2005, Russia’s President Vladimir
Putin and visiting PRC State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan announced that their two
countries would begin holding regular security consultations and at some point will
hold joint military exercises.40  According to Councillor Tang, China considers
Russia its “main partner for strategic cooperation,” and he emphasized that this was
the first time that China had ever established national security consultations with a
foreign government.   Despite lingering historical tensions between the two, the PRC
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and Russia are widely thought to be seeking mutual common ground as a
counterweight to U.S. global power.
European Union.   In recent years, China has courted the European Union
(EU) intensively, and Sino-EU contacts have broadened significantly as a result.  On
December 8, 2004, China and the EU held their 7th Annual EU-China Summit in The
Hague, with Premier Wen Jiabao leading the PRC delegation.  According to a
statement at the time by European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, the
EU considers China a “strategic partner” and has made developing Sino-EU ties “one
of our top foreign policy objectives in the years to come.”41   
Perhaps nothing illustrates China’s growing importance in Europe as much as
the recent EU campaign to lift the arms embargo that it (along with the United States)
has maintained against China since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.
Momentum to lift the embargo appeared to accelerate early in 2005 despite a number
of American efforts to derail it on the grounds that China has not made sufficient
improvements in its human rights record.  On February 2, 2005, the U.S. House of
Representatives acted on a measure urging the EU to maintain the embargo, passing
H.Res. 57 by a vote of 411-3.  Senator Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, has been quoted as saying he would support curbs on sales of
advanced military technology to EU countries unless the EU could give strong
assurances that advanced technologies would not be diverted to China should the
embargo be lifted.42  
Until China’s passage of the anti-secession law on March 14, 2005, EU
governments tended to dismiss American arguments that the PRC military, equipped
with improved EU-provided defense technologies, could use those technologies to
threaten Taiwan and U.S. forces in Asia.  But these American arguments appeared
strengthened by the PRC’s anti-secession law, and the EU’s campaign to lift the
China arms embargo appears to have abated for the present.  
Middle East and Africa.  For years, China has sold missile technology and
other sensitive materials to countries of security concern to the United States, such
as Iran, Syria, Libya, and Iraq.  More recently, China also is becoming a major energy
player in the Middle East with some of these same countries.  PRC negotiators, for
instance, were able to sign significant oil deals with Iran in 2004, including a
proposal that allows a Chinese company develop Iran’s Yadavarn oil field in
exchange for China’s agreeing to buy Iranian liquified natural gas.43 In addition,
China’s trade with the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has steadily
increased in the last few years, reaching $20 billion in 2004 (although this is still
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small by comparison with the United States, whose trade with Saudi Arabia alone in
2004 was $26 billion).44  
In 2000, China and African countries formed the China-Africa Cooperation
Forum (CACF), proposing that the CACF meet every three years to seek mutual
economic development and cooperation.  Representatives from 45 of Africa’s 55
countries attended the CACF’s first Ministerial Conference in October of that same
year.  China has also targeted resource-rich African nations such as Sudan and
Angola  for energy-related development.45  Senior Chinese leaders in 2004 visited
oil-producing states, including Algeria and Gabon, and news reports early in 2005
alleged that a  state-owned PRC energy company, China Shine, planned to drill
exploratory wells in a Namibian concession that was once held by Occidental
Petroleum.46  China has also shown an interest in iron ore deposits in Liberia and
Gabon.  In addition to resource-related imperatives, some observers have suggested
that there is a political dynamic to China’s push into Africa, as 6 of the 24 countries
that still maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan are on the African
continent.47
Western Hemisphere.48  There is also a political dynamic in China’s
expanding economic and trade relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean,
where another 12 countries still maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.49
In addition, China’s growing presence in the region also may have political and
economic consequences for the United States.  In September 2004, China sent a
“special police” contingent to Haiti — one of Taiwan’s official relationships —
marking Beijing’s first deployment of forces ever in the Western Hemisphere.  A
primary focus in the U.S.-Latin America debate over the U.S.-Central America Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is how to keep Latin American textile manufacturing in
the region viable in the face of the expected surge in Chinese textile industry exports
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with the end of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement on December 31, 2004.   On January
25, 2005, Chile became the first Latin American county to hold bilateral negotiations
with China to craft a Sino-Chilean Free Trade Agreement.  The two governments
appear to have made substantial progress in their negotiations, and a fourth round is
expected in Santiago in August 2005.  Beijing officials hope to ink a Sino-Chile Free
Trade Agreement before the end of the year, and hope it can become a model for
similar agreements with other Latin American countries.50
Energy concerns also play a role in China’s Latin-American diplomacy,
particularly in Venezuela, which now accounts for almost 15% of U.S. oil imports,
and in Brazil, with whom China announced a $10 billion energy deal in November
2004.51  As a consequence of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s visit to Beijing
in December 2004 and PRC Vice-President Zeng Qinghong’s visit to Venezuela in
January 2005, the two countries reportedly signed a series of agreements that
committed the China National Petroleum Corporation to spend over $400 million to
develop Venezuelan oil and gas reserves.52  Given the current poor state of U.S.-
Venezuelan relations under the Chavez government, some American observers worry
that Venezuelan energy agreements with China ultimately may serve to divert oil
from the United States.  
Chinese economic and energy concerns extend also to Canada.  On January 20,
2005, at the conclusion of Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin’s visit to China, the
two governments signed a series of agreements to promote international cooperation
on a range of issues and to make energy issues in particular — including gas, nuclear,
clean energy, and oil sources, primarily massive “oil sands” in Alberta — into
“priority areas” of mutual cooperation.  Energy discussions are to be maintained
through the Canada-China Joint Working Group on Energy Cooperation, formed
under a 2001 memorandum of understanding.  A major Canadian oil-pipeline
company, Enbridge, is said to be planning a major ($2.2 billion) pipeline project to
transport oil from Alberta’s oil-sands deposits to the west coast for shipment to wider
markets including China.53  
Economic Issues 
The PRC is now the third-largest U.S. trading partner, with total U.S.-China
trade in 2004 estimated at $232 billion.  Ongoing issues in U.S.-China economic
relations include the substantial and growing U.S. trade deficit with China ($162
billion in 2004), repeated PRC failures to protect U.S. intellectual property rights,
CRS-17
54 See CRS Issue Brief IB91121, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne Morrison, for further
details.
55 International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2004 Special 301 Report: People’s Republic
of China, February 2005, cited in CRS Issue Brief IB91121, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by
Wayne Morrison. 
and the PRC’s continuing restrictive trade practices, such as its refusal to date to float
its currency.54  In addition, some policymakers have focused recent attention on
efforts by PRC companies to buy American assets.  (For further information, see
CRS Issue Brief IB91121, U.S.-China Trade Issues, by Wayne Morrison.)
Intellectual Property Rights.  China’s lack of protection for intellectual
property rights (IPR) has become one of the most important issues in U.S.-China
bilateral trade.  According to calculations from U.S. industry sources, IPR piracy has
cost U.S. firms $2.5 billion in lost sales, and the IPR piracy-rate in China for U.S.
products is estimated at around 90%.55  U.S. officials routinely have urged Beijing
to crack down on IPR piracy, and Secretary of Commerce Don Evans stressed in his
last official visit to China in January 2005 that China needed to do better at IPR
protection.
Currency Valuation.  Another ongoing concern that arose in the 108th
Congress involved the PRC’s decision to keep the value of its currency low with
respect to the dollar, and indirectly with the yen and euro.  Since 1994, the PRC has
pegged its currency, the renminbi (RMB), to the U.S. dollar at a rate of about 8.3
RMB to the dollar.  In 2003, many U.S. policymakers concluded that this
RMB/dollar peg kept the PRC’s currency artificially undervalued, making PRC
exports artificially cheap and making it harder for U.S. producers to compete.  U.S.
critics of the PRC’s currency peg charged that the PRC unfairly manipulated its
currency, and they urged Beijing either to raise the RMB’s value or to make it freely
convertible subject to market forces.  Members of the 108th Congress introduced
multiple bills (such as H.R. 3058) to require the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to
analyze the PRC’s exchange rate policies and, depending on the results of that
analysis, to impose tariffs on PRC products to offset the price advantage the PRC is
believed to gain from its currency policies. On December 3, 2004, the U.S. Treasury
Department issued its biannual report on global foreign exchange, reporting that no
major U.S. trading partner — most notably the PRC — had met the technical
definition of currency manipulation.
National Security Issues 
Annual Report on China’s Military Power.  On July 19, 2005, the
Pentagon released its annual, congressionally-mandated report on China’s Military
Power.  (Appendix II of this paper contains a list, legislative authority, and text links
for selected mandated U.S. government reports on China, including the report on
China’s Military Power.)  The DOD report, normally submitted late, had been
expected for weeks (its due date is March 1 annually), and it reportedly was delayed
further this year because of bureaucratic disagreement about its conclusions.  The
2005 report appears to reflect a more alarmist view about military trends in China
than did earlier reports.  It concludes that China is greatly improving its military,
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including the number and capabilities of its nuclear forces, and that this build-up
poses a long-term threat to Taiwan and ultimately to the U.S. military presence in
Asia.  The tone of the report is expected to prompt renewed congressional debate
over what China’s military expansion means for U.S. interests and what should be
the proper U.S. response.
North Korea.  After over a year of stalemate and months of intensive
diplomacy behind the scenes, Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program
began again in Beijing with two meetings held in July-August 2005 and September
2005.  With both the North Korean and U.S. sides appearing to have moderated their
agendas, the talks resulted in the adoption of the first written agreement arising from
the talks — a joint statement of principles drafted with heavy Chinese involvement.
In the joint statement, the North Koreans agree to dismantle their nuclear program,
and the United States and the four other participants agree to discuss providing North
Korea with a light water reactor “at an appropriate time.”  But in the days following
the release of the joint statement, it became evident that the United States and the
North Koreans have different views about the proper sequencing and timing of these
two events.  Further talks are scheduled in Beijing for November 2005.56
The road to the North Korean nuclear crisis began in October  2002, when
Pyongyang told visiting U.S. officials that it was conducting a uranium enrichment
program in violation of its pledges under the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed
Framework.  The crisis continued to escalate as the United States, Japan, South
Korea, and other countries suspended energy assistance to North Korea and the latter
withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and restarted its nuclear reactor
at Yongbyon.  The Bush Administration rejected North Korean demands for bilateral
talks to resolve the crisis, and instead consented only to six-party talks involving
North and South Korea, the United States, the PRC, Japan, and Russia — still the
venue for nuclear discussions with North Korea.
As North Korea’s sole military ally, the PRC could be drawn into any armed
conflict involving North Korea — meaning the possibility of U.S.-China military
confrontation, an ally of South Korea.  In addition, since the PRC is North Korea’s
principal trade partner, any decision by the international community to impose
sweeping economic sanctions against North Korea would appear to require PRC
support.  Lack of that support would undermine any sanctions effort and also damage
U.S.-China relations. By the same token, collapse of the fragile North Korean regime
could have equally unhappy consequences for the PRC, leading to floods of North
Korean refugees into China and to the possible advance of U.S. military forces from
the South Korean side of the demilitarized zone to the PRC border.  
PRC officials have repeatedly emphasized that China supports a non-nuclear
Korean peninsula.  This support is thought to be genuine, since an unpredictable
North Korea armed with nuclear weapons could have unpleasant consequences for
Beijing — such as the creation of nuclear weapons programs in currently non-nuclear
neighbors like Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, or an accelerated U.S. commitment
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for a regional missile defense program, to name only two.  But Beijing has stopped
short of promising to put further pressure on North Korea, and in fact continues to
prop up the North Korean regime with supplies of food and fuel and to advocate
bilateral U.S.-North Korean dialogue.57
Weapons Proliferation.  For many years, U.S. officials and Members of
Congress have been concerned about the PRC’s track record of weapons sales,
technology transfers, and nuclear energy assistance to certain countries in the Middle
East and South Asia, particularly to Iran and Pakistan.  While some U.S. officials
have grown more confident that the PRC is changing its proliferation policies,
congressional and other critics  charge that such confidence is misplaced.58  They
point out that for years, reputable sources have reported China to be selling ballistic
missiles and technology for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the international
market, primarily in the Middle East.59  Although these allegations have always
created problems in Sino-U.S. relations, they have taken on new and potentially
significant implications given the Administration’s emphasis on controlling the
spread of weapons of mass destruction as well as WMD programs as well as later
disclosures that both Iran and North Korea are actively pursuing nuclear weapons
programs.  The PRC has had close relationships with all three countries in the past,
including sales of military equipment that could threaten U.S. forces in the region and
missiles that could enhance a nuclear weapons capability.60 
Military Contacts.  Once one of the stronger components of the relationship,
U.S.-China military relations have never fully recovered after they were suspended
following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.  Nevertheless, both countries
cautiously resumed military contacts during the 108th Congress, although efforts to
reenergize military ties met with repeated setbacks. In January 2005, several news
accounts tentatively reported that U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is
considering making his first trip as Secretary to China later this year.61  No further
details have been forthcoming.  (See appendix at the end of this report for a list of
recent U.S.-China official talks.)
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Human Rights
The Bush Administration generally has favored selective, intense pressure on
individual human rights cases and on rule of law rather than the broader approach
adopted by previous American administrations.  The PRC government periodically
has acceded to this White House pressure and released early from prison political
dissidents — usually citing health reasons and often immediately preceding visits to
China by senior Bush Administration officials.  On March 4, 2004, for instance, the
PRC released on medical parole one of its best-known political prisoners, Wang
Youcai, a co-founder of the short-lived China Democracy Party.  Days earlier, the
PRC released an imprisoned Tibetan nun, and on March 14, 2005, released Uighur
businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer, arrested in 1999 for “revealing state secrets.”  The
same day, the U.S. government announced that it would not introduce a resolution
criticizing China’s human rights record at the 61st Session of the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights in Geneva from March 14 to April 22, 2005. 
There were no such symbolic gestures before President Bush’s November 2005
visit to China.  Moreover, President Bush, during his Asia visit, publicly adopted a
different human rights approach, making universal freedom, religious freedom, and
democratization appear to be the centerpiece of U.S. policy in Asia.  There has been
little sign that the President’s November remarks or the U.S. position on human
rights has affected PRC policies, although there is growing evidence of increasing
social demands within China for greater accountability, transparency, and
responsiveness in government.  
On December 2, 2005, the first U.N. torture investigator allowed to visit China,
Manfred Nowak, stated his conclusion that while torture was on the decline (China
outlawed it in 1996), it was still a widespread problem in Chinese prisons.
Beginning November 21, 2005, Nowak spent two weeks visiting Chinese prisons and
speaking to detainees.  Nowak will present his findings at the 2006 meeting of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
New Internet and Media Restrictions.  The explosive growth of the
Internet, cell phones, and text messaging in China has helped make these relatively
unregulated electronic sources the dominant source of information for Chinese
citizens.  Beijing has increasingly viewed these new information sources as potential
threats to the central government’s ability to control and shape information flows,
and for several years PRC leaders have attempted to restrict and control the scope of
Web content and access.  On September 25, 2005, China imposed new regulations
designed to further limit the type of electronic news and opinion pieces available to
the Web-savvy in China.62  Among other things, the regulations prohibits major
search engines from posting their own independent commentary on news stories,
stipulating that only opinion pieces provided by state-controlled media may be
posted; requires internet service providers to record the content, times, and Internet
addresses of news information that is published and to provide this information to
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authorities upon inquiry; and in vague terms prohibits certain kinds of content from
being posted — such as content that “undermines state policy” or “disseminates
rumors [and] disturbs social order.”63  The new regulations are backed by penalties,
including fines, termination of Internet access,  and possible imprisonment.
Religious Freedom.  In recent years, the PRC has continued to crack down
on unauthorized religious groups and to restrict the freedoms of ethnic communities
that seek greater religious autonomy.  Much of this repression focuses on what PRC
officials have classified as illegal religious “cults” such as the Falun Gong and the
Three Grades of Servants Church.  Reports about religious freedom in China suggest
that state persecution of some religious and spiritual groups will likely continue as
long as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) perceives these groups to be threatening
to its political control.  However, religions in the PRC have also attracted increasing
numbers of adherents as well.  
In the China section of its most recent annual International Religious Freedom
Report, released September 15, 2004, the U.S. Department of State judged China’s
record on religious freedom to be poor and substantially the same as during recent
years.  The Secretary of State again designated China as a country of particular
concern in 2003 — a designation the PRC has earned each year since 1999.  The
State Administration for Religious Affairs, SARA, (formerly known as the Religious
Affairs Bureau, or RAB) continues to require churches to register with the
government.  Churches that are unregistered — so-called “house churches” —
continue to be technically illegal and often repressed by the government.  As in the
past, however, treatment of unregistered churches varies widely from locality to
locality, with some local officials highly repressive and others surprisingly tolerant.
Some suggest that in the 21st century the Communist Party has sought ways to
recognize religion as an integral part of Chinese society and to support religious
practices that it deems to perform positive social and political functions.  At a
national work conference on religion in 2001, for instance, then-Party Secretary Jiang
Zemin stressed religion’s positive role in society. On the other hand, by 2004 it
appeared that Party officials had grown more concerned about religion’s “de-
stabilizing” effects.  In January 2004, SARA held a national work conference on
religion that instead emphasized what it saw as negative and destabilizing aspects of
religious observance, including  cults and the growing circulation of foreign religious
materials.  As they have in the past, Communist Party officials continue now to stress
that religious belief is incompatible with Party membership.  
Tibet.  The political and cultural status of Tibet remains a difficult issue in
U.S.-China relations and a matter of debate among U.S. policymakers.   Controversy
continues over Tibet’s current political status as part of China, the role of the Dalai
Lama and his Tibetan government-in-exile, and the impact of Chinese control on
Tibetan culture and religious traditions. The U.S. government recognizes Tibet as
part of China and has always done so, although some dispute the historical
consistency of this U.S. position.   But the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader,
has long had strong supporters in the U.S. Congress who have continued to pressure
CRS-22
64 For background and details, see CRS Report RL30983, Tibet, China, and the 107th
Congress: Issues for U.S. Policy, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
65 James, Ian, “Guantanamo Prisoners from China’s Muslim Northwest Face Danger If
Returned Home, Human Rights Groups Warn,” Associated Press Newswires, May 28, 2004.
the White House to protect Tibetan culture and give Tibet greater status in U.S. law.
It was largely because of this congressional pressure that in 1997, U.S. officials
created the position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues, tasked with the
specific mission of helping to promote talks between the Dalai Lama and Beijing.
The current Special Coordinator — Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for
Global Affairs — is the highest-ranking U.S. official to have held this position.64
Although dialogue between the PRC and the Tibetan exile community remains
officially stalled, hopes for renewed momentum were raised by a number of unusual
developments in 2002-2003 that are outside the scope of what has come to be
expected of Beijing’s relations with the Dalai Lama’s representatives.  In 2002, the
Dalai Lama’s older brother, Gyalo Thondup, accepted a PRC invitation to spend
several weeks in Tibet on a private visit. On at least three occasions since then, the
PRC government invited to China and to Lhasa (Tibet’s capital) delegations from the
Tibetan community led by the Dalai Lama’s special envoy in the United States, Lodi
Gyari.  Further contacts and developments along these lines would reinforce the view
that a quiet dialogue  and perhaps compromise may be underway.  
Xinjiang’s Ethnic Muslims.  For years, the PRC government also has
maintained a repressive crackdown against Tibetans and Muslims, particularly
against Uighur “separatists” — those in favor of independence from China — in the
Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.  Although U.S. officials warned after
September 11, 2001 that the global anti-terror campaign should not be used to
persecute Uighurs or other minorities with political grievances against Beijing, some
believe that the U.S. government made a concession to the PRC on August 26, 2002,
when it announced that it was placing one small group in China, the East Turkestan
Islamic Movement, on the U.S. list of terrorist groups. 
U.S. policies on Uighurs and on terrorism faced a unique test during the 108th
Congress, when it became known that approximately 22 Uighur Muslims were being
held by U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay after having been apprehended during the
U.S. strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan.  By May of 2004, international
human rights groups were reporting their concerns about the planned release of
Uighur prisoners that U.S. forces had decided were of “no intelligence value.” These
prisoners, they feared, if repatriated to China, would be executed or imprisoned as
terrorists.65  In October 2004, in an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review,
Secretary of State Colin Powell said that U.S. officials were still reviewing the status
of the Uighur prisoners because of U.S. fears that returning them to possible
persecution in China would “be inconsistent ... with our obligations to comply with
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international law and consistent with [the] Geneva Convention...”66  Later press
reports said that a number of U.S. allies had refused requests to accept the prisoners.67
Family Planning Policies.  Because of allegations of forced abortions and
sterilizations in PRC family planning programs, direct and indirect U.S. funding for
coercive family planning practices is prohibited in provisions of several U.S. laws.
In addition, legislation in recent years has expanded these restrictions to include U.S.
funding for international and multilateral family planning programs, such as the U.N.
Population Fund (UNFPA), that have programs in China.  In the 108th Congress,
section 560(d) of H.R. 4818 (P.L. 108-447), the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2005, prohibited U.S. funds from being made available to UNFPA for a country
program in China. 
While the PRC has maintained its restrictive and at times coercive “one-child”
policy for several decades, there are growing indications that the government may be
re-thinking this policy.  Early in 2004, China’s new leadership appointed a task force
to study the country’s demographic trends and their implications for economic
development.  In October 2004, reports surfaced that Beijing was considering at least
one proposal to eventually scrap the one-child policy because of currently low PRC
birth rates and the economic implications this has for supporting China’s huge aging
population.  On January 6, 2005, the director of China’s National Population and
Family Planning Commission stated that the government intended to modify criminal
law to make it illegal to selectively identify and abort female fetuses.68  And on
January 21, 2005, an official from the PRC Ministry of Education stated that the
government would be lifting the long-standing ban on marriage and childbearing for
college and graduate students.  
Social Stability.  The far-reaching economic changes the PRC continues to
undergo have led to increasing disgruntlement among a number of social groups.
Peasants and farmers in rapidly developing parts of China are under heavy tax
burdens and falling farther behind their urban contemporaries in income.  Some have
had their farmland confiscated by local government and Party officials.  Officials
then sell the confiscated land for development, often reportedly offering little or no
compensation to the peasants from which the land was seized, resulting in sometimes
sizable protests. One widely publicized case occurred on December 6, 2005, in the
southern Chinese city of Dongzhou (Shanwei), when paramilitary forces opened fire
on villagers demonstrating against the confiscation of their land for the construction
of a new power plant.  An as yet uncertain number of villagers were killed.  
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In an effort to address rising rural complaints, the government early in 2005
proposed a new measure — the “2005 Number 1 Document” — to reduce taxes on
rural peasants, increase farm subsidies, and address the widening income gap
between urban and rural residents.  Rising labor unrest, particularly in northern and
interior cities, is another particularly troubling issue for Beijing, a regime founded on
communist-inspired notions of a workers’ paradise.  Increasing labor unrest also has
placed greater pressure on the authority and credibility  of the All-China Federation
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), China’s only legal labor organization.69
Hong Kong Governance 
On June 21, 2005, following his selection to the post by the 800-member Hong
Kong Election Committee, Donald Tsang was formally appointed Chief Executive
of Hong Kong by the PRC State Council.  He replaced Hong Kong’s unpopular
former Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, who submitted his resignation on March
10, 2005, two years before his term was to expire.  Controversy has grown steadily
in Hong Kong since late summer 2003, when massive  peaceful demonstrations,
involving tens of thousands of Hong Kong people, began to be held  in opposition to
“anti-sedition” laws proposed by Mr. Tung and in favor of more rapid progress
toward democratization — such as electing Hong Kong’s Chief Executive in 2007
and the Hong Kong legislature in 2008 by universal suffrage.  Beijing dealt these
democratic aspirations a stinging setback in April 2004 by ruling that universal
suffrage not only was not to be allowed as early as 2007, but that Beijing, and not
Hong Kong, would determine the proper pace for democratic reforms.  Critics
maintained that the Beijing decisions contravened provisions in Hong Kong’s Basic
Law leaving decisions on democratic development up to Hong Kong people
themselves.
While a pragmatist who is far more popular than his predecessor, the new Chief
Executive, Donald Tsang, also has been criticized by democracy activists.  As Hong
Kong’s Chief Secretary, Mr. Tsang had chaired a Tung-appointed task force charged
with consulting Beijing to devise a plan for democratic reforms in Hong Kong in
2007 and 2008.  The task force’s final recommendations, submitted in October 2005,
provide for only marginal changes to electoral procedures in 2007 and 2008, stopping
far short of expanding the franchise in Hong Kong in this decade or for the
foreseeable future.  The public response to the recommendations has been one of
disappointment.  On December 4, 2005, opponents of the recommendations held
another large public protest in Hong Kong in favor of greater political change.
Executive Tsang has defended the recommendations as being the most Hong Kong
can achieve at the moment given Beijing’s objections to more rapid democratization.
The Legislative Council is set to vote on the recommendations package on December
21, 2005, with a two-thirds vote required for passage.  A negative vote presumably
would leave the status quo in place and likely would create political complications
for PRC leaders and for Beijing — Hong Kong relations.
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Beijing’s decisions on Hong Kong have particular relevance for Taiwan, since
Beijing has held out the “one country, two systems” approach for Hong Kong as a
model for Taiwan’s eventual reunification with mainland China.  U.S. policy toward
Hong Kong is set out in the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-383).  In
addition to requiring annual U.S. government reports on Hong Kong’s conditions
through 2006, this act allows the United States to treat Hong Kong more leniently
than it treats the PRC on the condition that Hong Kong remains autonomous.  Under
the act, the President has the power to halt existing agreements with Hong Kong or
take other steps if he determines that Beijing is interfering unduly in Hong Kong’s
affairs.70
U.S. Policy Implications 
In the past year, some U.S. observers have become increasingly concerned about
China’s growing economic and political reach in the world — often referred to as
“China’s rise” — and what it means for global U.S. economic and political interests,
U.S.-China relations, and concerns for Taiwan’s security.  Some in this debate
believe China’s rise is a malign threat that needs to be thwarted; others believe that
it is an inevitable phenomenon that needs to be managed.  The 109th Congress is
increasingly faced with issues involving this emerging debate and whether U.S.
interests would best be served by accommodating China’s rise or containing it.  
According to one school of thought, China’s economic and political rise in the
world is inevitable and needs to be accommodated and managed.  In this view, as
China becomes more economically interdependent with the international community,
it will have a greater stake in pursuing stable international economic relationships.
Growing wealth in the PRC is likely to encourage Chinese society to move in
directions that will develop a materially better-off, more educated, and cosmopolitan
populace.  Over time, this population could be expected to press its government for
greater political pluralism and democracy — two key U.S. objectives.   Therefore,
from this perspective, U.S. policy should seek to work more closely with the PRC,
not only to encourage these positive long-term trends, but to seek ways to mutually
benefit by cooperating on important global issues such as alternative energy sources,
climate change, and scientific and medical advancements.  Ultimately, some
proponents of accommodation say, the United States simply will have to make room
for the economic and political appetites of the superpower that China is likely to
become.  Viewing the PRC as a “threat” or attempting to contain it, these proponents
say, could produce disastrous policy consequences for U.S. interests.  In addition to
possible military conflict with the PRC, they assert, these consequences could include
a breakdown in PRC governance, a fragmentation of the country itself, the creation
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of greater Chinese nationalism with a strong anti-American bias, and an increasingly
isolated United States that the international community may see as out of step with
global trends.
Other proponents of the “inevitability” of China’s rise stress the extreme
competitive challenges of China’s growing power which, even if benign, pose
potentially huge consequences for U.S. global interests.  Beijing officials, say this
group, view the world as a state-centered, competitive environment where power is
respected, and PRC leaders are determined to use all means at their disposal to
increase their nation’s wealth, power, and influence.  A militarily muscular China
with substantial international economic ties will be able to wield considerable
political power that could prompt U.S. friends and allies to make different choices,
eroding U.S. influence around the world.  The EU’s inclination to lift its arms
embargo against China despite strong U.S. objections is cited as an example of this
trend.  The United States, they argue,  should develop a comprehensive strategic plan
in order to counter China’s growing power by strengthen its existing regional
alliances and make new ones, expand overseas investments, sharpen American global
competitiveness, and maintain a robust military presence in Asia and elsewhere as
a counterweight to growing PRC power and influence.
Others in the American policy debate see less benevolent intentions in China’s
growing power.  PRC leaders, they argue, may be portraying their growth as a
“peaceful rise” with no harmful consequences, but actually they are biding their time,
simply conforming to many international norms as a strategy while China is still
weak.  In reality, these proponents say, Beijing seeks at least to erode and at best to
supplant U.S. international power and influence. In conducting their international
relations, they maintain, Chinese leaders seek to cause rifts in U.S. alliances, create
economic interdependence with U.S. friends, and arm U.S. enemies.  Despite the
statements of support for the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign, according to this view,
the PRC’s repeated violations of its non-proliferation commitments have actually
contributed to strengthening nations that harbor global terrorists.  Furthermore, they
maintain that the PRC under its current repressive form of government is inherently
a threat to U.S. interests, and that the Chinese political system needs to change
dramatically before the United States has any real hope of reaching a constructive
relationship with Beijing.  From this perspective, U.S. policy should focus on
mechanisms to change the PRC from within while remaining vigilant and attempting
to contain PRC foreign policy actions and economic relationships around the world
where these threaten U.S. interests.
Major Legislation71 
H.Res. 57 (Hyde)
Urging the European Union to maintain its arms embargo on the People’s
Republic of China.  Introduced on February 1, 2005; passed House on February 2,
2005, by a vote of 411-3.
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H.Res. 344 (Pombo)
A resolution urging the President to immediately review any CNOOC agreement
to buy the American energy company Unocal.  Introduced June 29, 2005, referred to
House International Relations and Financial Services Committees.  Considered under
suspension on June 30, 2005, passed by a vote of 398-15.
H.Con.Res. 83 (Smith)
Urging the United States to introduce a measure at the 61st U.N. Conference on
Human Rights calling on China to end its human rights abuses.  Introduced March
3, 2005, and referred to the House Committee on International Relations.  Mark-up
held on March 9, 2005.
H.Con.Res. 98 (Hyde)
Expressing the “grave concern” of Congress about China’s passage of an anti-
secession law aimed at Taiwan.  Introduced March 15, 2005.  The measure passed
on March 16, 2005, by a vote of 424-4.  It was referred to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on March 17, 2005.
H.R. 728 (Sanders)
To withdraw normal trade relations (NTR — formerly known as most-favored-
nation status, or MFN) from the PRC.  Introduced February 9, 2005, referred to
House Ways and Means Committee, to the Subcommittee on Trade (February 25,
2005).
H.R. 1498 (Ryan)
Chinese Currency Act of 2005.  To clarify that PRC currency manipulation is
actionable under U.S. countervailing duty laws and product-specific safeguards.
Introduced on April 21, 2005, and referred to House Ways and Means Committee
and House Armed Services Committee.  Executive comment was requested from
DOD on April 21, 2005.
H.R. 1815 (Hunter) (P.L. 109-163)
Authorizing appropriations for the Department of Defense for FY2006.
Introduced April 26, 2005.  H.Rept. 109-89.  The final Act was the result of a
conference.  Sec. 535 provides incentives to cadets and midshipmen to study key
languages, including Chinese; Sec. 1211 prohibits the Secretary of Defense from
procuring any goods or services from a “Communist Chinese military company,”
except on a waiver for national security reasons; Sec.1234 states the sense of
Congress that the White House should “quickly” present to Congress a
comprehensive strategy to deal with China’s economic, diplomatic, and military rise,
including specific mention of what areas such a strategy should address.  In
conference, the House receded on several key measures in its bill: on a measure to
mandate “at least” one class field study trip annually to both Taiwan and the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) by military education classes of the National Defense
University; on a measure to require regular senior U.S. military exchanges with
Taiwan military officials; and on a measure to prohibit the Secretary of Defense from
procuring goods or services from any foreign person who knowingly sells to the PRC
items on the U.S. munitions list.  House action:  After Committee and Subcommittee
mark-ups, reported (amended) by the House Armed Services Committee on May 20,
2005.  Referred to the House on May 25, 2005, and passed by a vote of 390-39.
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Referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 6, 2005.  Senate action:
On November 15, 2005, the Committee was discharged, the Senate considered the
bill under unanimous consent, and the Senate passed the bill after incorporating the
language of S. 1042.  Conference action:  Conferees filed a conference report on
December 12, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-360), and the House passed it on December 19,
2005 (374-41).  The Senate agreed to the Report by voice vote on December 21,
2005, and the President signed the bill into law on January 1, 2006, with a clarifying
statement ([http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060106-12.html]).
H.R. 2601 (C. Smith)
The State Department Authorization bill.  Title IX consists of the East Asia
Security Act of 2005, a bill to impose trade sanctions on persons, companies, and
governments (specifically the European Union, but also Israel and Russia) that sell
weapons to China in violation of agreed-upon export restrictions.  The bill also
contains annual reporting requirements on EU weapons sales to China and on foreign
governments participating in cooperative defense projects with the United States.
The East Asian Security Act originally was H.R. 3100, introduced by Representatives
Hyde and Lantos on June 29, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-165).  After mark-up by the House
International Relations Committee on June 30, 2005, H.R. 3100 was considered by
the House on July 14, 2005, on the suspension calendar.  It failed to achieve the
necessary 2/3 vote by a vote of 215-203, reportedly because of some Member’s
concerns that it would be unfairly punitive on U.S. defense contractors.  Responding
to these objections, the bill’s sponsors amended the bill to apply sanctions on U.S.
companies only if they knowingly sold items to China for military use.  The amended
version was then made in order as an amendment to H.R. 2601, which the House then
passed on July 20, 2005, by a vote of 351-78.  The bill was referred to the Senate on
July 22, 2005.
H.R. 3057 (Kolbe) (P.L. 109-102)
Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and related programs
for FY2006. Section 560(c) prohibited funds from being made available to the U.N.
Population Fund (UNFPA) for a country program in China; Section 575(b) provided
$4 million in ESF funds to NGOs to promote cultural traditions, sustainable
development, and environmental conservation in Tibet; Section 589 prohibited the
Export-Import Bank from using federal funds to approve an application for a nuclear
project in China.  Introduced in House June 24, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-152).  House
passed the bill, amended, by a vote of 393-32 on June 28, 2005.  Referred to the
Senate Committee on Appropriations on June 29, 2005 and ordered reported,
amended, on June 30, 2005 (S.Rept. 109-96).  Passed the Senate with an amendment
on July 20, 2005 (98-1).  The Senate named conferees on July 20, 2005; the House
on October 27, 2005.   Conference Report 109-265 was filed on November 2, 2005.
The conference report included the UNFPA funding prohibition, $4 million in ESF
funding to NGOs for Tibet programs (along with $250,000 to the National
Endowment for Democracy for democracy programs relating to Tibet); and a Senate
provision to provide $5 million in Development Assistance to American educational
institutions for activities and programs in the PRC relating to rule of law, the
environment, and democracy.   The House agreed to the Conference Report on
November 4, 2005 (358-39); the Senate on November 10, 2005 (91-0).  The bill was
signed by the President on November 14, 2005.  
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H.R. 3058 (Knollenberg) (P.L. 109-115)  
Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the
District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2006.
Section 951 of the bill (the Kilpatrick amendment) prohibited the Department of the
Treasury from using funds  to recommend approval of the sale of Unocal to the
PRC’s CNOOC Ltd. This language later was deleted by the Senate and was not
included in the final Conference Report language (H.Rept. 109-307) — which passed
the House on November 18, 2005 (392-31) and the Senate on November 21, 2005
(unanimous consent).  The President signed the bill into law on November 30, 2005.
H.R. 3100 (Hyde)
East Asia Security Act of 2005.  See H.R. 2601.
H.R. 3283 (English)
Introduced on July 14, 2005, and referred to the House Ways and Means
Committee.  The bill seeks to place further trade restrictions on non-market
economies and particularly to further restrict and  more heavily monitor various
aspects of China’s trade with the United States.  The House passed H.R. 3283 on July
27, 2005 (255-168), including a countervailing duties provision (in Section 3) with
respect to China.  The bill was referred to the Senate on July 28, 2005, to the
Committee on Finance.
S. 295 (Schumer)
Authorization of a 27.5% import duty on imports of PRC-made goods or
agricultural products unless the President certifies to Congress that China is not
indulging in unfair trade practices.  Introduced on February 3, 2005, referred to
Senate Committee on Finance.
S. 1042 (Warner) (see H.R. 1815, above) 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006.
Section 2539C of the Senate bill requires the Secretary of Defense to annually
report (by September 30) whether a foreign country with a reciprocal defense
procurement agreement with the United States has “qualitatively or quantitatively”
increased exports of defense items to the People’s Republic of China.  The Senate
bill was introduced on May 17, 2005.  On May 12, 2005, the Senate Armed Services
Committee ordered reported an original measure (S.Rept. 109-69), which was
considered by the Senate on July 20, 21, 22, 25, and 26, 2005.  (The House-passed
bill, H.R. 1815, was referred to the Senate on June 6, 2005.)  On July 26, 2005,
cloture was not invoked on the Senate measure, (50-48), and the bill was returned to
the calendar.  The Senate considered the bill for seven days beginning November 4,
2005.  It passed the measure (amended) on November 15, 2005 (98-0) and
incorporated it into H.R. 1815 as an amendment.  H.R. 1815 as amended ultimately
was enacted as P.L. 109-115.
S. 1117 (Lieberman)
U.S.-PRC Cultural Engagement Act.  To expand U.S. academic, cultural, and
business activities and increase American expertise in Chinese language and culture.
Provides funds to establish Chinese language centers to assist elementary and
secondary schools and institutes of higher learning in offering Chinese language
instruction; and funds to establish exchange programs between U.S. and PRC post-
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secondary educational institutions.  Introduced May 25, 2005, and referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations.  
Chronology
01/18/06 — PRC sources confirmed that North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il had just
completed a secretive, eight-day visit to China, ostensibly to discuss
the Six-Party Talks.
01/14/06 — Villagers in Panlong village in Guangdong Province were attacked by
police officers (and possibly paramilitary troops) on their sixth day of
protests against government land seizures. 
01/08/06 — China’s State Council issued a national emergency response plan,
dividing emergencies into four categories: natural disasters;
accidents; public health incidents; and social safety incidents. 
01/04/06 — Bolivia’s president-elect Evo Morales arrived in Beijing for a two-day
visit, calling China “a political, ideological and programmatic ally”
and inviting Beijing to develop Bolivia’s natural gas reserves.
12/15/05  — The day after it announced containment of the bird flu epidemic,
China reported its sixth human case of avian flu — in eastern Jiangxi
Province.
12/14/05 — Malaysia hosted the first meeting of the East Asia Summit (EAS) of
16 Asian countries, including China — but not the United States.  
12/06/05 — Security officials opened fire on protesters, killing some, in the town
of Dongzhou, in Guangdong Province.  The protesters were objecting
to plans to build a new power plant on confiscated farmland.  
10/26/05 — The United States notified Congress that it had approved for sale to
Taiwan 10 AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles and 5 AIM-7M Sparrow
missiles, worth as much as $280 million, both systems manufactured
by Raytheon.
10/26/05 — A Canadian court approved China National Petroleum Corporation’s
$4.2 billion offer bo buy Canadian company PetroKazakhstan.  
10/26/05 — The United States (backed by Japan and Switzerland) asked the WTO
to force China to reveal details about how it is using legal and
regulatory procedures to crack down on piracy of intellectual
property.
10/24/05 — The PRC’s Ministry of Agriculture confirmed an outbreak of H5N1
flu in geese and chickens in Anhui Province, Liangying City.  
CRS-31
09/25/05 — Thousands of Taiwan citizens marched through Taipei in protest to
the legislature’s delay in passing the “special arms budget” to
purchase American weapons. 
09/20/05 — Edward Ross, a senior Pentagon official, said it was reasonable to
question whether the United States should continue to provide for
Taiwan’s self-defense “if Taiwan is not willing to properly invest in
its own self-defense.”
07/19/05 — The Pentagon released the annual Chinese Military Manpower report
for 2005.  The report had been delayed for several months, reportedly
due to bureaucratic disagreement over some of its conclusions.
07/01/05  — Russia and China issued a joint statement, The Declaration on World
Order in the 21st Century, denouncing “aspiration for monopoly and
domination in international affairs” and calling for non-interference
in other countries’ internal affairs.  Most interpreted the statement to
be targeting U.S. policy.  
06/30/05 — The House voted 333-92 in favor of the Kilpatrick amendment to
H.R. 3058, the  FY2006 Appropriations bill for the Departments of
Transportation and others, prohibiting funds from being used to
recommend approval of the sale of UNOCAL to the PRC’s CNOOC.
06/21/05 — CNOOC made an unsolicited $18.5 billion cash bid for American
energy company Unocal.
06/14/05 — The Congressional China Caucus was formally launched.  
06/05/05 — Agence-France Presse reported that in recent months (perhaps
March), Taiwan had successfully test-fired its first “Hsiung-Feng”
cruise missile, with a range of 1,000 miles.
04/15/05 — Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong presented his credentials as new PRC
ambassador to the United States.
03/20/05 — Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice began two days of meetings in
Beijing as part of her first trip to Asia as Secretary of State.  
03/17/05 — China released Uighur Muslim businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer, 17
months early in her eight-year sentence for “revealing state secrets.”
03/14/05 — China’s National People’s Congress adopted an “anti-secession” law
targeted at reining in Taiwan independence advocates.  The full text
is at [http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t187406.htm]
02/21/05 — According to the Asian Wall St. Journal, the U.S. Export-Import
Bank made a preliminary commitment to provide Westinghouse
Electric with a $5 billion package to build 4 nuclear plants in China.
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02/19/05 — The United States and Japan issued a joint statement describing
mutual security concerns, including Taiwan.  
02/03/05 — By a vote of 411-3, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a non-
binding measure condemning the EU’s plans to lift the arms embargo
against China imposed after the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989.  
01/08/05 — According to the Los Angeles Times (p. C-3), the United States and
China agreed to a new, multi-entry visa policy to facilitate business
and tourist visits, effective January 15, 2005.
CRS-33
Appendix I: 
Selected Visits by U.S. and PRC Officials
December 7, 2005 — U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick met in
Washington D.C. with PRC Executive Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo in the
second session of the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue.  At the same time, U.S. Under
Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs Josette Shiner
also hosted a dialogue with Mr. Zhu Zhixin, Vice Chairman of China’s National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).  (See August 1, 2005.)
November 20, 2005 — President Bush met with President Hu Jintao and
Premier Wen Jiabao in Beijing.  His visit to China was part of an overall Asia trip
that began in Japan and included South Korea and Mongolia.  His remarks in China
emphasized a U.S. commitment to the spread of democracy and to universal human
rights and freedoms.
October 18, 2005 — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made his first
official trip to China as Secretary, meeting with President Hu Jintao and PRC
Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan.  During his two-day trip, Secretary Rumsfeld
visited the Second Artillery and addressed rising Communist Party cadres at the
Central Party School, urging China to expand political freedoms and be more
transparent about China’s military.
October 11, 2005 — Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snow and Chairman
of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan began a week-long visit to China, among
other things discussing China’s currency valuation and trade surplus.  
September 13, 2005  — President Bush and President Hu Jintao met in New
York while attending a U.N. meeting.  The Bush-Hu New York meeting substituted
for a Hu visit to Washington that was postponed at the last minute because of U.S.
preoccupation with Hurricane Katrina.
August 1, 2005 — U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick arrived in
Beijing to initiate “a new senior dialogue on global issues” in which Beijing and
Washington will take turns as hosts.   The session was the first of what is expected
to be a regular U.S.-China Senior Dialogue.
July 8, 2005 — Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Commerce
Luis Gutierrez, Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns, and U.S. Trade
Representative Rob Portman left for a visit to the PRC for discussions about North
Korea’s nuclear program, tougher enforcement of anti-piracy laws for intellectual
property, and other issues.  The visit includes a meeting of the U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT).  
June 6, 2005  — Secretary of Commerce Luis Gutierrez arrived in Beijing for
meetings with his counterpart, Chinese Commerce Minister Bo Xilai.  Gutierrez
urged the PRC to crack down on IPR piracy, calling IPR violations “a crime.”
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March 20- 21, 2005 — Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held talks in
Beijing with PRC officials as part of a visit to Asia, including stops in India,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Japan, and South Korea.  Her discussions included North
Korea and the Six-Party talks, Taiwan, human rights, and plans to hold a regular
U.S.-China senior dialogue.
February 2, 2005 — U.S. officials from the National Security Council, Michael
J. Green and William Tobey, presented evidence to officials in Japan, South Korea,
and China that North Korea may have exported uranium to Libya.  Mr. Green also
delivered a letter from President Bush to President Hu Jintao underscoring the
urgency of North Korea’s possible sale of nuclear materials. 
January 31, 2005 — U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Richard
Lawless held talks in Beijing to discuss U.S.-China security cooperation.
January 12, 2005 — Secretary of Commerce Don Evans began a two-day visit
to China — his fourth and last as Secretary — telling his Chinese hosts that the PRC
needed to move to a floating exchange rate and protect intellectual property rights.
January 4, 2005  — Chen Yunlin, the PRC’s senior cross-strait official as head
of the cabinet-level Taiwan Affairs Office, began a U.S. visit to discuss China’s
proposed anti-secession law.  While in Washington, Chen met with Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage, new National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and U.S.
Asian affairs official Michael Green.
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Appendix II: 
Selected U.S. Government Reporting Requirements
International Religious Freedom Report, China (annual report)
Most recent date available: November 8, 2005
Agency:  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor
Legislative authority:  P.L. 105-292, the International Religious Freedom Act
(IRFA) of 1998, Section 102(b) 
Full text:  [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/]
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (annual report)
Most recent date available: May 2005 
Agency:  U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
Legislative authority:  P.L. 105-292, the International Religious Freedom Act




Reports on Human Rights Practices, China (annual report)
Most recent date available:  February 28, 2005
Agency:  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor
Legislative authority:  The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended,
Sections 116(d) and 502(b); and the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, Section
504
Full text:  [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/index.htm]
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (annual report)
Most recent date available: July 19, 2005
Agency:  U.S. Department of Defense
Legislative authority:  P.L. 106-65, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2000, Section 1202
Full text:  [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf]
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions
(semi-annual report)
Most recent date available:  July 1 through December 31, 2003
Agency:  Director of Central Intelligence
Legislative authority:  FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 721
Full text:  [http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm]
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2005 (annual report)
Most recent date available:  March 2005
Agency:  U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Matters
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Legislative authority: Section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (the “FAA,” 22 U.S.C. §  2291);  sections 481(d)(2) and 484(c) of
the FAA; and section 804 of the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1974, as
amended).  Also provides the factual basis for designations in the President’s
report to Congress on major drug-transit or major illicit drug producing
countries pursuant to P.L. 107-115, the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2002, Section 591
Full text:  [http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/]
Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance (annual report)
Most recent date available:  December 12, 2005
Agency:  United States Trade Representative
Legislative authority:  P.L. 106-186, the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000,





Report Monitoring to Congress on Implementation of the 1979 U.S.-PRC
Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology (biannual report) 
Most recent date available:  April 15, 2005 
Agency: U.S. Department of State, Office of Science and Technology Cooperation
Legislative Authority:  P.L. 107-314, Bob Stump National Defense Authorization
Act Section for FY2003, Section 1207
Full text:  [http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/44681.htm]
Report on Tibet Negotiations (annual report)
Most recent date available: June  2005
Agency:  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Legislative Authority:  P.L. 107-228, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003,
Section 613
Full text:  [http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/45015.htm]
